United Nations S/2017/305

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 April 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 10 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that the Security Council, under the Presidency of the United States of America, will hold its quarterly open debate on the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, on Thursday, 20 April 2017. In order to help steer the discussion, the United States has prepared a concept note (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nikki **Haley**
Ambassador
United States Permanent Representative

17-05828 (E) 120417

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Annex to the letter dated 10 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note for the Security Council quarterly open debate on the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, to be held on 20 April 2017

Multiple conflicts throughout the Middle East have left hundreds of thousands of people dead and millions displaced. The cross-border influx of foreign terrorist fighters has added complexity to an opaque network of terrorist groups with ever-shifting alliances that threaten international peace and security in the region and the world. In Iraq, the Government continues to whittle away at territory controlled by ISIS around Mosul, while the difficult work of reconciliation and reconstruction has only just begun in earnest. Meanwhile, some states continue to sponsor terrorist groups or other militias that are fomenting unrest throughout the region. Hizbullah, for example, remains a terrorist group that not only undermines Lebanon's security, but also plays a key role in enabling the Syrian conflict and providing advice to other terrorists and extremists in the Middle East. In Libya, political factions are struggling to reach a political solution to the country's ongoing political and security crisis, which will hinge on effective United Nations involvement. The Security Council addresses a number of conflicts on a regular basis, but all too often loses sight of the interplay among conflicts and the role of some actors in fomenting and benefiting from conflict throughout the region.

The quarterly open debate provides an opportunity for Council members, Member States and others to examine the conflicts in the Middle East through a broader lens and address what they view as the most serious issues of international peace and security in the Middle East.

Briefer

The United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Nickolay Mladenov.

Key questions

Members of the Security Council, Member States and others participating in the open debate are encouraged to think in terms of regional and global contexts, with international peace and security at the core of their observations. Key questions to address will include:

- Who are the regional players that most benefit from chaos in the region, and what are the connections between terrorist groups and these states?
- What steps can be taken to identify and address threats to international peace and security?
- How can the international community work to ensure that bad actors do not benefit from post-conflict reconstruction efforts?

United Nations A/71/868–S/2017/306

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
12 April 2017

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 31
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 10 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a statement released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 8 April 2017 with regard to the recent massive U.S. missile attack on Syria (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ja** Song Nam
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-06011 (E) 250417

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Annex to the letter dated 10 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 8 April 2017 with regard to the U.S. missile attack on Syria

U.S. Missile Attack on Syria Unpardonable

The Trump administration, on 7 April 2017, mounted a massive missile attack on an air force base of the Syrian Government under the pretext that it had killed civilians by using chemical weapons.

A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry, in a statement on April 8, termed this an act of aggression on a sovereign state that can never be tolerated.

Through the recent U.S. military attack on Syria, the world clearly sees who is the disturber and wrecker of peace.

Successive U.S. administrations have perpetrated strikes only at those countries that do not have nukes, styling themselves a superpower, and the same is true of the Trump administration.

Some forces are loud mouthed, saying that the recent U.S. military attack on Syria is an action of "warning" to the DPRK, but the latter is not frightened by such threat.

What happened in Syria once again taught a bitter lesson that no one should have illusions about the imperialists and that one can defend oneself from imperialist aggression only when one has strength.

Our tremendous military muscle, with a nuclear force as its pivot, serves as a treasured sword of justice for foiling the U.S. shameless high-handed and arbitrary practices and aggressive moves, protecting the sovereignty of the country and the right of the nation to existence.

The reality today goes to prove that any aggression should be countered with force alone and that the DPRK's choice is entirely just as it has bolstered its nuclear force remarkably.

The DPRK will increase its military capability for self-defence in every way to cope with the U.S. evermore reckless moves for a war and will defend itself with its own force.

United Nations S/2017/307

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 April 2017

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2285 (2016), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 April 2017 and requested me to provide a report to it on the situation in Western Sahara before the end of the mandate period. It covers developments since the last report dated 19 April 2016 (S/2016/355) and describes the situation on the ground, the status and progress of the political negotiations on Western Sahara, the implementation of resolution 2285 (2016) and the existing challenges to the Mission's operations and steps taken to address them.

II. Recent developments

2. On 14 August 2016, Morocco began clearing an area inside the buffer strip below Guerguerat, in the south of the Territory, and paving a desert track linking its position at the berm and the Mauritanian border post 3.8 kilometres to the south. MINURSO received no advance notification of the activity. On 18 August, Morocco's coordinator with MINURSO sent a letter to the Special Representative for Western Sahara and Head of Mission confirming that the clearance activities under way in the Guerguerat area had started on 14 August and were being conducted by the Royal Moroccan Gendarmerie and customs officers, without the intervention of Royal Moroccan Army personnel.

3. On 15 August 2016, Frente Polisario deployed armed personnel to a position immediately beyond the southernmost reach of the road construction in order to stop the Moroccan works from proceeding. Those personnel were replaced on 29 August by armed elements from what the Frente Polisario has described as its "National Gendarmerie", and a fully armed protection rear guard was positioned behind them in the buffer strip. On 16 August, MINURSO started to conduct regular ground patrols and aerial reconnaissance over Guerguerat. On 28 August, the Mission deployed a static team of military observers between the Moroccan and Frente Polisario positions along the road during daylight hours and conveyed to the parties its readiness to maintain a night presence, if requested, and to set up a team site, if required.

4. Frente Polisario insists that the presence of its armed elements in and near Guerguerat was established in self-defence against Morocco's attempt to change the

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status quo by paving the desert track and has argued repeatedly that the potentially explosive situation requires a solution beyond the "mere recording of violations" of military agreement No. 1. Frente Polisario further maintains that Morocco's activities in the buffer strip constitute a violation of military agreement No. 1, which, inter alia, prohibits the entry of military personnel or equipment by ground or air and the firing of weapons in or over the area, and of the 1991 ceasefire. The core of its argument is that, according to Moroccan law, the Royal Gendarmerie is an integral part of the Royal Moroccan Army and has military status. Frente Polisario also argues that, when the ceasefire came into effect in 1991, there was neither an opening in the berm nor civilian traffic between the berm and the Mauritanian border in Guerguerat, and that the current traffic therefore violates the status of the Territory and of the ceasefire, since it changes the status quo of the buffer strip.

5. In its communications with MINURSO and the Secretariat, Morocco has strongly objected to the accusations that it has violated military agreement No. 1, which does not prohibit civilian activities. It insists that its clearing and paving actions were an exclusively civilian operation undertaken by a civilian contractor and its Royal Gendarmerie and customs services to counter illicit activities and facilitate road transport between Morocco and Mauritania and beyond and that no Royal Moroccan Army personnel had crossed the berm. Morocco also insists that the presence of Frente Polisario inside the buffer strip, the hoisting of flags of the "Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic", the erection of what it terms to be prohibited structures and the impediments to the transit of civilian vehicles are violations of military agreement No. 1 and an unacceptable challenge to the authority of the United Nations and MINURSO. It has repeatedly informed MINURSO and the Secretariat that it cannot be expected to refrain from reacting to the situation indefinitely.

6. On 25 August 2016, MINURSO wrote to both parties, urging them to refrain from conducting any activity inside the buffer strip. On 28 August, my predecessor released a statement calling on both parties to suspend any action that altered the status quo and appealing to them to withdraw all armed elements to prevent any further escalation. He also called on the parties to permit MINURSO to pursue discussions with them to reach a resolution, stressing the need to adhere to their obligations under the ceasefire agreement and to respect its letter and spirit.

7. In early September 2016, Moroccan engineers finished paving the road up to the position of the Royal Gendarmerie, which was approximately 120 metres from the position of the Frente Polisario "National Gendarmerie".

8. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations visited Rabat, Laayoune and Rabouni, from 21 to 24 October 2016 and conducted an aerial reconnaissance flight over Guerguerat. He reiterated my predecessor's call for the full withdrawal of both sides and received assurances of their intention to avoid escalation and their commitment that neither side would provoke a return to hostilities.

9. In December 2016, Frente Polisario military forces were reported in the media to have reached the coastline along the Cape Nouadhibou peninsula south of Guerguerat, hoisting the flag of the "Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic" in the presence of the Secretary-General of Frente Polisario. Although MINURSO did not detect any human presence on its repeated aerial reconnaissance flights along the peninsula, two flags were spotted. The Frente Polisario leadership also confirmed to MINURSO that a number of its elements had "reached the Atlantic coastline" but provided no further details.

10. Furthermore, Frente Polisario established additional positions staffed by military forces in the buffer strip along the protection rear guard. The personnel established several structures south of the Gendarmerie line, within a radius of 2 kilometres, consisting of small drywall constructions, some of which had roofs and

were the height of a person. MINURSO observed tents, as well as flags or insignia of the "Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic" in at least three of the locations. Morocco submitted numerous complaints to the Secretariat and MINURSO opposing these activities, describing them as "unacceptable provocations".

11. Tensions continued to rise until they reached a peak in mid-February 2017, when Frente Polisario started impeding the movement through Guerguerat of civilian and commercial vehicles displaying Moroccan insignia and maps showing Western Sahara to be part of Morocco, citing the latter, in particular, as a deliberate provocation. On several occasions, MINURSO observed damage to vehicles whose drivers had ignored the request by Frente Polisario units to stop at their position or who had stopped but were obliged to remove Moroccan insignia. Such damage included broken windows or scratches to paintwork caused by Frente Polisario elements during the removal of insignia. Morocco vigorously protested these incidents, requesting MINURSO to intervene.

12. On 25 February 2017, I issued a statement strongly urging Morocco and Frente Polisario to unconditionally withdraw all armed elements from the buffer strip near Guerguerat, to adhere to the letter and spirit of their obligations under the ceasefire agreement and to refrain from obstructing regular commercial traffic. On 26 February, Morocco announced its unilateral withdrawal from the buffer strip so as "to immediately apply and respect the request made by the United Nations Secretary-General". Initially, Morocco indicated that removing the Royal Gendarmerie from the buffer strip would be contingent on the full withdrawal of the Frente Polisario presence, the removal of its constructions and the completion of the road to the Mauritanian border. The same day, Frente Polisario issued a statement sharing my concerns over the situation in Guerguerat, but arguing that the situation was not an isolated incident and that the crisis could therefore be overcome only by taking the "decolonization process" for Western Sahara into account, which would open the way to its withdrawal. Frente Polisario also placed conditions on its withdrawal from the buffer strip, including a full Moroccan withdrawal from the area, as well as demonstrable progress in the negotiating process and on broader issues, such as Morocco's respect for the status, privileges and immunities of MINURSO (see para. 58 below) and the Mission's return to full functionality.

13. All construction by Frente Polisario has now ceased, but the movement of vehicles with Moroccan insignia and maps continues to be impeded. Meanwhile, MINURSO has maintained its temporary presence in the area during daylight hours and stands ready to establish a longer-term presence, if required.

14. MINURSO was unable to return to full functionality within the 90-day time frame stipulated by the Security Council in its resolution 2285 (2016). On 12 June 2016, an agreement was reached with the Government of Morocco on the return of 25 of the expelled international staff members, who were subsequently redeployed to the Mission. Numerous consultations have been undertaken with the Government of Morocco on the return of the remaining affected staff. In March 2017, the Secretariat initiated steps to address the status of those staff members who remained affected. Subsequently, on 4 and 5 April, the Permanent Representative of Morocco conveyed, in separate meetings, to my Under-Secretaries-General for Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations his authorities' readiness to accept the immediate return of all 17 MINURSO staff members who have been unable to return to their duty station since March 2016.

15. A mission support review was carried out in late 2016 to ensure that the MINURSO support structure enabled it to effectively implement its mandate. The review identified a number of ways to streamline the Mission's work processes, rationalize staffing levels and deliver services more efficiently.

16. Overall, the mission support review provided guidelines for critical actions to enhance the robustness and agility of the Mission's support component, including by restructuring support to include supply chain and service delivery and by moving certain non-location-specific posts to Entebbe, Uganda, and Brindisi, Italy.

17. In a military capability study, finalized in March 2017, it was noted that the Mission's security posture and capacity needed to be improved to better respond to the evolving security challenges. In particular, upgrading security infrastructure at team sites was identified as a priority, along with the augmentation of existing aviation capacity to ensure that the Mission was able to complete mandated observation tasks in areas of increased threat. The adoption of adjusted patrolling and support tasks was also noted as a positive step, although regular reviews were required to ensure mandate delivery and security. The lack of full functionality has been seen to impede the military activities of the Mission owing to the increased demands on military observers to perform support tasks.

18. On 7 October 2016, insofar as MINURSO could ascertain, legislative elections were held without incident in Morocco and in the part of Western Sahara under Moroccan control. In a letter to my predecessor dated 24 September 2016, the Secretary-General of Frente Polisario denounced Morocco's conduct of these elections in Western Sahara, calling them an "illegal and provocative act given its status as a Non-Self-Governing Territory".

19. On 6 November 2016, King Mohammed VI delivered an address to mark the forty-first anniversary of the Green March, focusing on Morocco's application to rejoin the African Union. Regarding Western Sahara, the King stated that Morocco's "southern provinces" were strong "thanks to their populations' commitment to their Moroccan nationality and to the nation's political system". The address also praised "the specific development model and projects launched in the region", and the potential for Western Sahara "to become an integrated development hub, at both the regional and continental levels, and a platform for economic cooperation between Morocco and Africa". He also indicated that "Morocco will remain open and ever ready to engage in constructive dialogue in order to find a final political settlement". Frente Polisario issued a statement strongly criticizing the substance of the King's speech, calling its delivery in Dakar a reflection of "its expansionist policy against neighbours" and "a deliberate offence against Africa and its continental organization".

20. In the refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria, public life and social activities were conducted peacefully and in a relatively calm atmosphere.

21. On 31 May 2016, the Secretary-General of Frente Polisario, Mohammed Abdelaziz, passed away. Brahim Ghali was elected as his successor at an extraordinary congress, held on 8 and 9 July, following his nomination by the National Secretariat of Frente Polisario.

III. Political activities

22. Both parties expressed criticism of certain elements of the previous report (S/2016/355). In a letter to the Personal Envoy dated 23 April 2016, the representative of Frente Polisario in New York stated that "the Polisario is and will remain attached to the referendum on self-determination". In a letter to my predecessor dated 24 April 2016, the Permanent Representative of Morocco criticized the report as unbalanced in its presentation of the facts and the positions of the various stakeholders.

23. In June 2016, the Personal Envoy began to consult the parties and neighbouring States on a resumption of the negotiating process. Frente Polisario, Algeria and Mauritania were consistently encouraging, while Morocco noted that more time was needed before the atmosphere would be conducive to a resumption of talks.

24. In a letter dated 29 July 2016 addressed to both parties and both neighbouring States, the Personal Envoy formalized his request and indicated his desire to visit the region before the seventy-first session of the General Assembly to review recent developments and their implications, as well as the regional situation. Frente Polisario, Algeria and Mauritania responded that they stood ready to receive him at any time. Morocco replied positively, in principle, but deferred providing a concrete response. On 2 September, the Permanent Representative of Morocco informed the Personal Envoy that Morocco preferred to receive him after the new Government had formed, following the legislative elections on 7 October.

25. On the margins of the opening of the seventieth session of the General Assembly, the Personal Envoy consulted with a wide range of European, African and Latin American representatives, all of whom had expressed strong but general support for the negotiating process. He also met with senior representatives of both parties and both neighbouring States.

26. The then Minister-Delegate to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Morocco, Nasser Bourita, reiterated that his country "remains a defender of, and engaged in, the negotiating process, to which it is committed on the basis of its autonomy initiative". He noted that, for Morocco, the conflict is a regional dispute with Algeria. He also indicated that the Personal Envoy would be welcome to visit Morocco after the new Government had formed and ideally after the conclusion of the twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Marrakech, Morocco, from 7 to 18 November 2016. A member of the National Secretariat of Frente Polisario, Mohammed Salem Ould Salek, expressed regret over the lack of progress in the negotiating process. He emphasized the eagerness of Frente Polisario for the process to resume and reiterated its readiness to receive the Personal Envoy. He also described the difficulty that Frente Polisario was facing in maintaining the commitment of Western Saharans to the 1991 ceasefire in the absence of any progress towards the referendum for which the ceasefire had been established.

27. The Minister of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Algeria, Ramtane Lamamra, underscored the importance of reviving the negotiating process, welcomed the Personal Envoy's proposed visit and stressed that his country would play a positive role in support of the parties once the process was once again under way. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Mauritania, Isselkou Ould Ahmed Izid Bih, also welcomed the Personal Envoy's visit and stressed his county's concern regarding the security situation in the region, including the worrisome developments in the Guerguerat region of Western Sahara, as well as the need to resolve the overall conflict in order to improve the living conditions of all of North Africa's populations through economic integration.

28. On 18 October 2016, the Personal Envoy briefed the Security Council, outlining the factors that had prevented progress to date in the negotiating process, including the failure of one or both of the parties to implement the Council's guidance. He encouraged Council members to press both parties to engage in a genuine process of preparing a fifth round of formal negotiations to be held without preconditions and in good faith.

29. On 15 November 2016, my predecessor met with King Mohammed VI on the margins of the twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties and

underscored the importance of making progress in the Western Sahara negotiating process, as called for in the relevant Security Council resolutions. The King confirmed Morocco's intention to continue working towards a solution within the United Nations framework, but added that he could not meet with the Personal Envoy prior to his departure on an extended trip through Africa. A senior member of the Secretariat was told in a subsequent meeting that Morocco would no longer receive the Personal Envoy because of his alleged bias in favour of Frente Polisario and Algeria.

30. In response to an invitation from the Government of France, the Personal Envoy visited Paris from 21 to 23 November 2016 to exchange views on the stalemate in the negotiating process and the tense situation in Guerguerat. His interlocutors expressed continued support for United Nations efforts, heightened interest in working to revive the negotiating process and a readiness for further dialogue on how best to proceed in the light of seven years of deadlock.

31. The Personal Envoy sent me a letter dated 23 January 2017 tendering his resignation effective on a date of my choosing. On 24 January, I received a Moroccan emissary who transmitted the King's readiness to work with me seeking a resolution of the Western Sahara dispute and who confirmed that Morocco would no longer receive the Personal Envoy.

32. On 29 January 2017, I met with the Prime Minister of Algeria Abdelmalek Sellal, the Minister of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Ramtane Lamamra, and the Minister of Maghreb Affairs, the African Union and the Arab League, Abdelkader Messahel, on the margins of the African Union summit in Addis Ababa. We discussed the situation in Guerguerat as well as the need to resume the negotiating process on Western Sahara. I expressed my understanding of the complexity of the situation and my desire to maintain a frank dialogue with Algeria as I strive to relaunch the negotiating process. The Prime Minister reaffirmed the readiness of Algeria to continue working with the United Nations.

33. On 17 March 2017, I received the Secretary-General of Frente Polisario for an introductory meeting that permitted him and his delegation to detail the position of Frente Polisario on the entire range of issues pertaining to Western Sahara and to set forth its expectations of the Secretariat and the Security Council. I expressed my concern over the situation in Guerguerat and my disappointment that Frente Polisario had not yet withdrawn from the buffer strip in response to my appeal of 25 February. I confirmed my earnest intention to work to relaunch negotiation efforts with a new dynamic and a new spirit, but insisted that I needed the parties' help in creating an environment conducive to negotiations, in particular by bringing the tensions in the Guerguerat area to an end.

IV. Activities of MINURSO

A. Operational activities

34. As at 15 March 2017, the military component of MINURSO consisted of 244 personnel, 11 of whom were female, against the authorized strength of 246. The military component remains deployed at nine team sites and a liaison office in Tindouf.

35. From 1 April 2016 to 15 March 2017, MINURSO conducted 7,560 ground patrols covering 10,32,165 kilometres, 427 aerial patrols and visited units of the Royal Moroccan Army and the military forces of Frente Polisario to monitor

adherence to the military agreements. Beginning in August 2016, 70 special aerial patrols were conducted over Guerguerat and along the Cape Nouadhibou peninsula to monitor developments. West of the berm, MINURSO military observers regularly visited 589 units, 38 training areas and 316 observation posts of the Royal Moroccan Army and monitored 399 notified operational activities. East of the berm, the military observers regularly visited 79 units, 11 training areas and 39 observation posts of the Frente Polisario military forces and monitored four notified operational activities. The Royal Moroccan Army complained three times to MINURSO that supporters of Frente Polisario had held demonstrations near the berm, denouncing them as provocations. MINURSO monitored the demonstrations from a distance and did not observe the presence of Frente Polisario military forces among the demonstrators. Local cooperation with the Mission's team site commanders has been maintained at a generally satisfactory level by both parties.

36. West of the berm, MINURSO recorded four general violations by the Royal Moroccan Army, in addition to the nine long-standing violations indicated in the report on the situation concerning Western Sahara dated 10 April 2015 (S/2015/246, para. 25). The general violations concerned tactical reinforcements at two strong points and one observation post, as well as the failure to notify MINURSO of troop movements on one occasion. MINURSO also recorded a violation by the Royal Moroccan Army in relation to a shooting incident that took place in the buffer strip near Mijek on 27 February 2016, leading to one civilian casualty, the review of which was not completed in time for the previous report (S/2016/355, para. 6). The Royal Moroccan Army's second line of defence, 15 kilometres from the berm, which remained operational (S/2016/355, para. 34), has constituted a major long-standing violation since September 2008. In response to notifications sent by the Mission with regard to those long-standing violations, the Royal Moroccan Army stated that they were "operational necessities" stemming from a changed environment and the need to fight terrorism, smuggling and other illicit activities and that they were unrelated to the ceasefire agreement. It further stated the need to replace 18 inoperable artillery pieces.

37. East of the berm, MINURSO observed and recorded eight general violations: the entry of Frente Polisario military forces into the buffer strip on two occasions; the temporary establishment of an observation post inside the buffer strip near Bir Lahlou; the holding of a military exercise by Frente Polisario without notifying MINURSO on two occasions; the relocation of accommodation of one company of Frente Polisario armed forces; and two freedom-of-movement violations. These violations were in addition to the three long-standing violations indicated in previous reports.

38. MINURSO is reviewing the activities of both parties in the Guerguerat area in the light of possible violations of military agreement No. 1 or of the spirit of the 1991 ceasefire agreement.

39. Since security concerns precluded the Mission's ground patrols in the buffer strip and along the Cape Nouadhibou peninsula between 15 August 2016 and 15 March 2017, 74 reconnaissance flights were conducted, placing a considerable strain on the Mission's limited air assets. Between 29 August 2016 and 26 February 2017, MINURSO maintained a presence between the Moroccan and Frente Polisario elements during daylight hours. That presence was subsequently extended to monitor the activities of the Frente Polisario "National Gendarmerie" after the withdrawal of Moroccan forces on 26 February 2017. Safety concerns required personnel to withdraw overnight to the town of Dakhmar.

B. Mine action

40. Landmines and explosive remnants of war continued to pose a threat to the Mission's ceasefire monitoring efforts. As of 15 March 2017, 50 cluster bomb strike areas and 36 minefields remained east of the berm. Morocco's expulsion of the Mission's mine action international staff from Laayoune in March 2016 resulted in the suspension of demining operations east of the berm from 20 March to 15 September 2016, when the MINURSO Mine Action Coordination Centre resumed its operations from Tindouf, where it had been relocated.

41. In support of the Mission's ceasefire monitoring, the Mine Action Coordination Centre conducted clearance of landmines and explosive remnants of war, route verification east of the berm and landmine safety training to incoming MINURSO staff. During the reporting period, 1,856,569 m^2 of land were released and 900 explosive hazards, including 678 cluster sub-munitions, 189 unexploded ordnance items and 17 anti-tank mines, were destroyed. The Coordination Centre cleared 19 cluster strike areas of medium to high priority and verified 65 km of patrol routes to facilitate MINURSO patrols to the east of the berm.

42. The Royal Moroccan Army reported the clearance of more than 217,980,000 m^2 of land to the west of the berm and the destruction of 949 items.

C. Security

43. The security environment in the Mission's area of responsibility remains vulnerable to the potential for regional instability. Primary responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel, assets and resources rests with Morocco, Frente Polisario and Algeria (in and around Tindouf), which continue to cooperate on security matters.

44. My Special Representative continued to engage with her Moroccan, Frente Polisario and Algerian counterparts to address the changing security environment. The Moroccan authorities continued a constructive discussion with MINURSO on enhancing their protective measures for the United Nations west of the berm. Frente Polisario regularly updated the Mission on possible threats and suggested further protection measures east of the berm and in the refugee camps. The Royal Moroccan Army and Frente Polisario responded positively to the requests by MINURSO to augment their protection of its team sites (S/2016/355, para. 46). MINURSO has also increased its alertness and situational awareness, although its security section has been affected by limitations to its full functionality.

45. On 23 November 2016, MINURSO received information from a Member State that a terrorist group affiliated with Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) had identified MINURSO team sites east of the berm as targets. The group had published a video on 5 May 2016 calling for attacks against MINURSO and Morocco and is also believed to have been involved in the kidnapping of three international humanitarian workers from Rabouni, near Tindouf on 23 October 2011 (see S/2012/197, para. 51). MINURSO therefore increased security measures around the team sites east of the berm and for MINURSO personnel movements. Frente Polisario officials confirmed the threat and reiterated their commitment to provide protection for the MINURSO static team site installations east of the berm. However, on several occasions, Frente Polisario warned that it was unable to guarantee the secure movement of the Mission's patrols or supply convoys unless they were protected by Frente Polisario mobile armed escorts.

46. In response to the warnings, the Department of Safety and Security conducted security assessments focusing on activities east of the berm, in Tindouf and in the refugee camps, based on which the existing restriction on all night-time movements of United Nations staff in Tindouf and the refugee camps was extended, distance limitations were placed on ground patrols east of the berm and remote areas with limited Frente Polisario presence were avoided. Possible risk-mitigating measures continue to be assessed, and MINURSO is adjusting its processes on an ongoing basis.

47. Observation coverage has been augmented by aerial patrols to observe areas inaccessible to ground patrols, while the logistics supply chain has been reviewed to minimize non-critical movements. Supplies delivered by road have been limited to lifeline items, including bulk water and fuel, as well as assets requiring ground transportation. All other supplies are being delivered by air. In view of that situation and the increased need for aerial reconnaissance in Guerguerat, the limited air assets of MINURSO have been under strain, prompting the Mission to request an additional helicopter, which would substantially increase its capacity to conduct aerial reconnaissance, meet logistics demands and carry out casualty or medical evacuations.

48. MINURSO has also reviewed the static security installations at team sites east of the berm, which had not been overhauled for some time, and has prepared plans for upgrading security facilities to address the evolving threat. Concurrently, all MINURSO personnel were instructed to apply extreme caution and vigilance during movements east of the berm and around Tindouf.

49. The above measures do not offer permanent solutions to ensuring the most secure environment possible for the Mission's civilian and military personnel in extremely exposed and remote locations. While the acquisition of an additional helicopter to enhance reconnaissance capacities would certainly alleviate the impact of the above-mentioned reduced patrol regime, more sustainable solutions will need to be found.

D. Substantive civilian activities

50. Only 25 of the Mission's international staff were redeployed to Laayoune in mid-July 2016 as part of an agreement with the Government of Morocco on restoring MINURSO to full functionality.

51. Despite the significantly reduced international staff capacity of the Mission and the onset of the crisis in Guerguerat, my Special Representative has endeavoured to maintain sustained contact with the parties, primarily through their respective coordination offices.

52. West of the berm, and despite the Security Council's repeated calls for access to all interlocutors, the Mission's access to local interlocutors was essentially limited to the Moroccan coordination office for civilian staff and representatives of the Royal Moroccan Army for the military component. The access enjoyed previously to other local interlocutors (S/2014/258, para. 47) has yet to be restored. The Mission continued to receive regular visits by representatives of embassies in Rabat.

53. East of the berm and in the refugee camps near Tindouf, MINURSO maintained access to representatives of Frente Polisario and refugees, as well as with local and international civil society organizations. Primarily through its leadership and its liaison office in Tindouf, the Mission maintained constructive

cooperation with Frente Polisario on operational and other matters related to the implementation of its mandate.

54. The significant increase in tensions stemming from the situation in Guerguerat has, however, led to increased criticism of MINURSO and the United Nations by both parties for their perceived inability to resolve the stalemate.

E. Challenges to the operations of the Mission

55. As noted in previous reports, the parties have significantly divergent interpretations of the Mission's mandate. In Morocco's view, the role of MINURSO is limited to monitoring the ceasefire, supporting demining and assisting the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with confidence-building measures in the event that such activities resume after their interruption in July 2014; it does not encompass contact with civil society or other civilian actors. In contrast, in the view of Frente Polisario, organizing a referendum on self-determination remains the central element of the Mission's mandate, with ceasefire monitoring and other activities subordinate or instrumental to that aim. In fact, it has become clear that some aspects of the implementation of the mandate remain subject to the agreement of the parties. In addition, the ability to perform all standard peacekeeping functions, including independent reporting on developments in and related to Western Sahara, remains key to an effective response to the expectations and requests of the Security Council.

56. West of the berm, the Mission's previous contact with the regional offices of the Moroccan National Human Rights Council in Laayoune and Dakhla, sporadic contact with locally elected officials and tribal sheikhs and occasional travel by the Mission's political affairs officers to Smara and Dakhla for consultations with local authorities helped the Mission obtain a broad and impartial understanding of the situation for the purposes of reporting to the Secretariat and the Security Council. However, even these limited contacts have been restricted since March 2016. A military liaison office in Dakhla was closed at the request of Morocco in April 2016. Furthermore, the agreement in principle reached with the Government of Morocco in 2015 on the use of United Nations number plates on MINURSO vehicles west of the berm has yet to be implemented, and the situation described previously persists (S/2016/355, para. 49).

57. Safety considerations, including the presence of explosive remnants of war, bar the Mission's military observers from ground movements around Guerguerat. Mine clearance in the buffer strip is not foreseen in the relevant agreements with the parties, considerably limiting the ability of MINURSO military observers to patrol and verify developments. These verifications have to be conducted using the Mission's limited air assets. Furthermore, the team assigned to monitor developments in Guerguerat had to be re-assigned from other team sites, further straining ceasefire monitoring operations elsewhere. Since the beginning of the crisis in Guerguerat, the parties have also raised an increasing number of allegations, requiring the Mission's military observers to conduct verification exercises in each instance.

58. In a letter dated 13 November 2016, the Secretary-General of Frente Polisario, Brahim Ghali, complained about Morocco's continued practice of affixing stamps on the passports of MINURSO staff members in Western Sahara and requiring that United Nations vehicles bear Moroccan licence plates. He made reference to the separate letters that the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United Nations Legal Counsel had sent to the Government of Morocco and to the Secretary-General of Frente Polisario, calling upon them to respect the status,

privileges and immunities of MINURSO in that regard (S/2016/355, paras. 35-37). Mr. Ghali warned that, unless the United Nations is able to ensure Morocco's compliance with those provisions, Frente Polisario will not feel bound to adhere to them either. Potential measures may include imposing entry procedures east of the berm for MINURSO personnel (S/2016/355, para. 35).

59. In view of the potential disruptive implications of such measures, MINURSO established a logistics hub in Tifariti and permanently redeployed medical staff from the military medical unit. This will enable MINURSO to ensure continuity of operations at team sites east of the berm for 90 days if movement disruptions occur. While necessary, this has severely overstretched the Mission's medical and logistical capacity. To address that issue, MINURSO reiterates its request for 11 additional paramedics and three additional doctors for the military medical unit provided by Bangladesh.

V. Humanitarian activities and human rights

A. Persons unaccounted for in the conflict

60. The International Committee of the Red Cross continued to act as a neutral intermediary between the parties, working with the families of individuals who are still unaccounted for in relation to past hostilities.

B. Assistance to the protection of Western Saharan refugees

61. UNHCR continued to provide international protection to Western Saharan refugees living in the five camps near Tindouf and, together with its partners, delivered life-saving assistance and livelihood activities, targeting young people in particular. This included multisectoral activities in the areas of protection, shelter, water and sanitation, health, nutrition, education, provision of non-food items and livelihoods. Pending the consideration of the registration of refugees in the camps near Tindouf, as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 2285 (2016), the humanitarian assistance provided by UNHCR and the World Food Programme (WFP) continued to be based on a planning figure of 90,000 vulnerable refugees, with WFP providing an additional 35,000 food rations to persons with poor nutritional status, for a total of 125,000 monthly food rations.

62. Following the inter-agency emergency response to the heavy flooding in October 2015, UNHCR shifted to the second phase of the response, namely providing materials to rebuild damaged or destroyed homes, constructing homes for persons with specific needs and rehabilitating and constructing schools. Owing to insufficient funding, shelter rehabilitation activities targeted only the 2,000 most vulnerable families of the 17,841 families that were affected.

63. Operations continued to be affected by underfunding, despite high-level efforts to mobilize additional assistance. Following my predecessor's visit in March 2016, he called for more attention to the plight of refugees from Western Sahara, for increased funding to support them and for a meeting of donors to be held in Geneva. Donor briefings led by UNHCR were held in September and November 2016, in Algiers and Geneva, respectively. A joint appeal requesting $135 million for humanitarian needs in 2016 and 2017 followed. As of the end of 2016, UNHCR had received funding for only 34 per cent of its annual requirements ($29 million).

64. Owing to shortages in commodities, the WFP supply of food fluctuated and minimum requirements were not met over several months. UNHCR and WFP

conducted a joint nutrition and food security survey in the five camps, which indicated that rates of anaemia in women and children had significantly increased and that malnutrition in pregnant and lactating women had become a concern. UNHCR has been working, together with relevant service providers, on cases of sexual and gender-based violence to ensure that referral mechanisms and legal, medical and psychosocial support are available. A women's centre has been built to address individual cases with specific protection needs.

65. UNCHR is continuing to pursue its multi-year livelihoods strategy, focusing, in particular, on youth empowerment.

C. Confidence-building measures

66. The confidence-building measures programme stipulated in the plan of action of 2012 has been suspended since June 2014. While continuing its dialogue with the parties, UNHCR remains ready to facilitate the prompt resumption of the programme. With 12,114 registered individuals waiting to benefit from family visits, UNHCR remains committed to the programme's mandate and principles.

D. Human rights

67. Representatives of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) last visited Laayoune and Dakhla from 2 to 18 April 2015 and Tindouf from 29 July to 4 August 2015, and engaged with relevant interlocutors to plan a follow-up mission to Western Sahara once the new Government of Morocco was in place. In 2016, OHCHR had to rely on reports from various stakeholders, including the Government of Morocco, Frente Polisario, non-governmental organizations working on human rights and international human rights mechanisms.

68. The special procedures of the Human Rights Council did not visit Western Sahara during the reporting period. The Government of Morocco has maintained its request that a follow-up visit to Western Sahara by the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, originally scheduled for April 2015, be delayed.

69. In its concluding observations adopted on 2 November 2016 (CCPR/C/MAR/CO/6), the Human Rights Committee welcomed Morocco's efforts to combat torture and ill-treatment and noted a marked reduction in such practices since the issuance of its previous concluding observations in 2004 (CCPR/CO/82/MAR). The Committee nonetheless expressed concern about continued reports of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment perpetrated by agents of the State in Morocco and Western Sahara, particularly in the case of individuals suspected of terrorism or endangering State security or posing a threat to "the territorial integrity of the State", which Morocco defines as including Western Sahara.

70. According to various sources, the lack of accountability for these and other human rights violations against Western Saharans, as well as the persistent lack of any investigation into allegations of such violations, were major concerns during the reporting period. As of 27 February 2017, despite ongoing discussions, the Government of Morocco had not established or designated a national preventive mechanism for inspecting places of detention as envisaged by the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture. On 22 February 2017, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture announced that it intends to visit Morocco in 2017.

71. Several Western Saharan human rights groups continued to experience difficulties in carrying out their activities, as the Government of Morocco continued to reject their registration and, therefore, their legal recognition. In that respect, the Moroccan National Human Rights Council received at least 10 complaints from local organizations.

72. Similarly, the alleged harassment of Western Saharan human rights defenders by the Moroccan authorities remains of serious concern. Restrictions were reportedly imposed on some human rights defenders entering and leaving Western Sahara west of the berm, thereby limiting their freedom of movement. According to local and international sources, Moroccan authorities allegedly restricted access to Western Sahara for foreign visitors, including journalists and human rights defenders. The Government of Morocco confirmed to OHCHR that some 187 foreigners were forcibly expelled from the "southern provinces", reportedly for failing to abide by immigration rules or for "undermining national security".

73. Although it remained difficult to obtain independent confirmation, various credible sources reported that the Moroccan authorities continued to routinely prevent or disperse gatherings in Western Sahara west of the berm. In several instances, protesters and activists were allegedly subjected to arbitrary arrest, unfair trial and imprisonment on trumped-up charges. In a note verbale to OHCHR dated 17 February 2017, the Government of Morocco indicated that 776 protests had been organized in the "southern provinces" in 2016, including 343 in Laayoune, and confirmed that 66 had been dispersed for non-respect of the law.

74. In July 2016, the Moroccan Court of Cassation ordered the full retrial of 23 Western Saharan co-defendants in the Gdeim Izik case, including 21 prisoners who had been sentenced to life in prison by a military court.[1] The first retrial started in December 2016, but was adjourned until 31 January 2017. The last trial took place on 13 March 2017. In a letter dated 12 March, the Secretary-General of Frente Polisario called for the release of the prisoners and of all Western Saharans imprisoned for expressing their political views. In a letter dated 26 March, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Morocco rejected the misrepresentations that "the other parties" were putting forward on this case.

75. Western Saharans continue to face alleged discrimination in the practice of their economic, social and cultural rights. In its concluding observations, the Human Rights Committee also expressed its concern about the limited progress made regarding the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara and the failure to adopt the measures necessary to consult the people of Western Sahara on the exploitation of their natural resources (CCPR/C/MAR/CO/6, para. 9).

76. During the period under review, Frente Polisario continued to express its readiness to cooperate with United Nations human rights mechanisms. The few human rights groups that exist in the refugee camps continued to operate freely, without any reported impediments.

VI. African Union

77. During the reporting period, Morocco did not permit the observer delegation of the African Union, led by Yilma Tadesse (Ethiopia), to return to Laayoune and resume its collaboration with MINURSO.

78. Meanwhile, the Assembly of the African Union, at its twenty-eighth ordinary session, held in Addis Ababa on 30 and 31 January 2017, accepted Morocco's

[1] S/2013/220, paras. 14, 81 and 82; S/2014/258, para. 81; and S/2016/355, para. 57.

application for membership as its fifty-fifth member State, following its ratification of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The African Union expressed the hope that the membership of Morocco would facilitate the speedy resolution of the dispute over Western Sahara in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

VII. Financial aspects

79. The General Assembly, in its resolution 70/283, appropriated the amount of $52.6 million for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017. My proposed budget in the amount of $55.2 million (exclusive of budgeted voluntary contributions in kind) for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018 has been submitted to the Assembly for its consideration during the second part of its resumed seventy-first session. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of MINURSO beyond 30 April 2017, the cost of maintaining the Mission would be limited to the amounts approved by the Assembly. As at 21 March 2017, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for MINURSO amounted to $39.6 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $1,124.1 million. Troop costs have been reimbursed for the period up to 31 October 2016, while the costs of contingent-owned major equipment and self-sustainment have been reimbursed for the period up to 30 September 2016, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

VIII. Observations and recommendations

80. The conflict over the future legal status of Western Sahara must come to an end as soon as possible to enable the region to confront security threats, economic challenges and human suffering in a coordinated and cooperative manner. The efforts of the United Nations, including those of my Personal Envoy, MINURSO and the agencies present on the ground remain highly relevant.

81. In a series of resolutions beginning in 2007, the Security Council has directed the Secretary-General to facilitate direct negotiations between the parties to reach "a mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara". Over the years, the Council has provided ample guidance that the negotiations are to occur without preconditions, in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments, and working with realism and a spirit of compromise. The parties have been called upon to show political will and to work in an atmosphere favouring dialogue, to enter into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations and to discuss each other's proposals in preparation for a fifth round of formal negotiations. The Council has also called on the parties and neighbouring States to cooperate more fully with the United Nations and with each other to achieve progress and has invited Member States to lend appropriate assistance.

82. Despite the achievements of two successive Personal Envoys in providing the necessary facilitative framework, the parties have not taken advantage of this framework to engage in a cooperative search for a solution in accordance with the guidance of the Security Council. The fundamental difficulty is that each party has a different vision and reading of the history and documents relating to the conflict. Morocco insists that Western Sahara is already part of Morocco, that the sole basis for negotiations is its initiative for autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty and that Algeria must be a party to those negotiations. Frente Polisario insists that, since the

General Assembly identifies Western Sahara as a Non-Self-Governing Territory, its autochthonous population must decide its future in a referendum with independence as an option, that all proposals and ideas the parties put forward should be on the table and that the only parties to the negotiation are Frente Polisario and Morocco.

83. On the basis of consultations with the parties and neighbouring States, members of the Group of Friends on Western Sahara and the Security Council, as well as other important stakeholders, I intend to propose that the negotiating process be relaunched with a new dynamic and a new spirit that reflect the Council's guidance, with the aim of reaching a mutually acceptable political solution that includes resolution of the dispute over the legal status of Western Sahara, including through agreement on the nature and form of the exercise of self-determination. For progress to be made, the negotiations must take into consideration the proposals and ideas of both parties. Algeria and Mauritania, as neighbouring countries, can and should make important contributions to this process.

84. Each party that I will be consulting has a role to play in increasing the chances of success. If the current framework of negotiations is to achieve results on the basis of the existing guidance of the Security Council, difficult decisions will be required of the parties, their supporters and the Council itself. If these decisions are not forthcoming, the appropriate conclusions will have to be drawn.

85. In exercising its mandate as outlined in paragraph 55 above, MINURSO makes an important contribution to promoting the stable and peaceful environment needed to create the necessary minimal conditions for the resumption of negotiations in the context of my efforts and those of my Personal Envoy. It also retains an important role in keeping the Secretariat and the Security Council informed of developments in and surrounding Western Sahara. These include developments relating to the ceasefire and to the political and security conditions in its area of operations that have a direct bearing on the negotiating process. I therefore recommend that the Council extend the mandate of MINURSO for a further 12 months, until 30 April 2018.

86. The Mission's reporting functions depend on its ability to perform the full range of standard peacekeeping functions without hindrance, so that it may reach an independent and unbiased assessment of the situation on the ground and its potential impact on peace and stability in Western Sahara. I call on the Security Council to use its good offices to support the efforts of MINURSO in this respect.

87. While reviews were conducted to align the Mission's resources with recent developments in its operational environment, its staffing levels need to be adequate to the tasks it faces and in order to meet the expectations of the Security Council. In that regard, the decision communicated by Morocco on 4 and 5 April 2017 to allow all MINURSO staff members to return to their posts will enable a return to full functionality. I am grateful to the members of the Council for their support and their efforts to restore the Mission to full functionality. I also ask the Council to support the Mission's request to strengthen the medical unit provided by Bangladesh by adding three medical and 11 paramedical staff.

88. I welcome the positive response of Morocco to my call for both parties to withdraw from the buffer strip in Guerguerat and remain deeply concerned by the continued presence of Frente Polisario armed forces. That presence poses challenges to the raison d'être of the buffer strip, including the expectation that it would create a zone free from the direct presence of the parties to the conflict or direct contact between them. Recognizing that the current situation may threaten the existence of the ceasefire regime, I ask the Security Council to urge Frente Polisario also to withdraw from the buffer strip in Guerguerat fully and unconditionally. I welcome the parties' continued assurances of their intention to avoid all acts that could lead

to a resumption of hostilities, but note that the risk of an incident, or an accident, remains high and that the possible consequences could have a dangerous impact on security and stability throughout the region.

89. The crisis in Guerguerat raises fundamental questions regarding the ceasefire agreement and military agreement No. 1. Those agreements, which are used as the primary tool in the Mission's ceasefire monitoring activities, bind only the parties' respective military forces and contain no provisions on civilian activities. Certain activities may, however, be assessed as being contrary to the spirit of the 1991 ceasefire or as acts that might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

90. The security situation in Western Sahara, especially east of the berm, poses a tangible threat to United Nations personnel and assets. Under these circumstances, I urge the Security Council to support the Mission's efforts to secure the means required to protect its staff, military observers and facilities in Western Sahara. Increased threats to ground movements and the need to monitor the situation in Guerguerat have considerably increased the Mission's aviation resource needs, leading to the request for an additional helicopter. The Mission must review how it can fulfil its mandate in a safe, secure and effective manner. Static security measures at team sites also urgently need upgrading.

91. I note with great concern the chronic lack of funding for the refugee programme and the deteriorating humanitarian situation, which is especially precarious as needs are increasing while funding is diminishing. Overall, barely half of the humanitarian requirements provided by the relevant agencies were funded in 2016. The amount required to cover humanitarian needs is expected to increase to approximately $75 million in 2017. I therefore call on the international community to increase funding to this vital humanitarian programme and appeal to new donors to support life-saving assistance.

92. I urge the parties to respect and promote human rights, for example, by addressing gaps and enhancing cooperation with OHCHR and other United Nations human rights mechanisms, including by further facilitating OHCHR follow-up visits. Independent, impartial, comprehensive and sustained monitoring of the human rights situation in Western Sahara and in the refugee camps is required in order to ensure the protection of all Western Saharans.

93. In conclusion, I wish to extend my sincere thanks to my Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, for his engagement with the parties and neighbouring States. Similarly, I am very grateful to my Special Representative for Western Sahara and Head of MINURSO, Kim Bolduc, and Major General Wang Xiaojun, as well as his predecessor, Major General Muhammad Tayyab Azam, for their dedicated leadership of MINURSO. These committed international officials have my appreciation for the work they have been carrying out in the most difficult of circumstances.

Annex

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

Contributions as at 22 March 2017

Country	*Military observers*[a]	*Troops*[a]	*Civilian police*[b]	*Total*
Argentina	3	–	–	3
Austria	5	–	–	5
Bangladesh	8	20	–	28
Brazil	8	–	–	8
Bhutan	2	–	–	2
China	12	–	–	12
Croatia	7	–	–	7
Djibouti	1	–	–	1
Egypt	21	–	–	21
El Salvador	3	–	–	3
Finland	–	–	1	1
France	2	–	–	2
Germany	3	–	–	3
Ghana	8	7	–	15
Guinea	5	–	–	5
Honduras	12	–	–	12
Hungary	7	–	–	7
India	3	–	–	3
Indonesia	5	–	–	5
Ireland	3	–	–	3
Kazakhstan	4	–	–	4
Malawi	3	–	–	3
Malaysia	10	–	–	10
Mexico	4	–	–	4
Mongolia	4	–	–	4
Montenegro	2	–	–	2
Nepal	6	–	–	6
Nigeria	7	–	–	7
Pakistan	14	–	–	14
Poland	1	–	–	1
Portugal	–	–	1	1
Republic of Korea	4	–	–	4
Russian Federation	16	–	–	16
Sri Lanka	3	–	–	3
Switzerland	2	–	–	2

Country	*Military observers*[a]	*Troops*[a]	*Civilian police*[b]	*Total*
Togo	1	–	–	1
Yemen	8	–	–	8
Total	**207**	**27**	**2**	**236**[c]

[a] Authorized strength is 246, including the Force Commander.
[b] Authorized strength is 12.
[c] Actual strength on the ground, for military and civilian police, including the Force Commander.


MOROCCO
ALGERIA
MAURITANIA
Western Sahara
ATLANTIC OCEAN
CANARY ISLANDS
Agadir
Tiznit
Sidi Ifni
Goulimine
Tan-Tan
Zag
Tindouf
Tarfaya
Laayoune
As-Sakn
Al Ga'da
Hawza
Idriya
Mahbas
Al Farcia
Smara
Boucraa
Bir Lahlou
Tifariti
Mehaires
Benaili
Boujdour
Aridal
Guelta Zemmur
Bir Mogrein
Chalwa
Zhayra
Tagarzimat
Oum Dreyga
Bir Anzarane
Baggari
Ad Dakhla
Aargub
Imlily
Mijek
Zouérate
Awsard
Agwanit
Dougaj
Guergerat
Bir Gandouz
Tichla
Zug
Bou Lanuar
Choum
Nouadhibou
La Guera
Atar
Lanzarote
La Palma
Tenerife
Santa Cruz de Tenerife
Fuerteventura
Las Palmas
Gran Canaria
Gomera
Hierro
HQ MINURSO
BANGLADESH
LO
MINURSO
April 2017
Medical unit
Liaison office
UN team site
Berm
Paved road
0 50 100 150 200 km
0 50 100 mi
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Map No. 3691 Rev. 82 UNITED NATIONS
April 2017(Colour)
Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

S/2017/308

Readex
Fiche

United Nations S/2017/308

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 April 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 10 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I would like to transmit a letter from the President of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, Anas Abdah, dated 7 April 2017 (see annex).

I would be grateful if you could have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Alya Ahmed S. **Al-Thani**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-06092 (E) 180417

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 10 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On the morning of 4 April 2017, the world woke up to the horrific news of Assad's chemical attack on innocent civilians in Khan Sheikhoun. This massacre, which killed about 100 civilians, was not only, unfortunately, a manifestation of Assad's criminality but also a manifestation of the international community's failure to take action where it must to protect civilians and to support the Syrian people in their just struggle for freedom, justice and dignity. Unlike the victims of the 2013 chemical massacre, however, the cries of the victims of the chemical massacre in Khan Sheikhoun seem to have been heard and the people of Syria finally woke up to a newfound hope and sense of justice on 7 April 2017, as President Donald Trump ordered a targeted strike against the air base from which Assad launched his deadly attack on Khan Sheikhoun.

After more than six long years of utter abandonment, the Syrian people have finally regained hope that Assad's crimes against them will no longer go unpunished.

The National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces has welcomed the strike by the United States, which has become necessary as the Security Council continues to be paralysed by recurrent Russian vetoes. We believe the action by the United States to be consistent with international resolutions and principles, including Council resolutions 2118 (2013), 2209 (2015), 2235 (2015) and the responsibility to protect. We join President Trump in his call for civilized nations to join the United States to rid Syria of Assad's terrorism.

Not only will a forceful approach deter Assad and curb his crimes against the Syrian people, but it will also exert the necessary leverage on Assad to engage seriously in the political process, which has otherwise been at a stalemate for quite some time. The National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, as the political representative of the Syrian people, is still keen on engaging in the political process leading to a political transition in which Assad and his clique have no role. The massacre in Khan Sheikhoun, as well as the many violations of the ceasefire and indiscriminate attacks against civilians, has made it clear that Assad cannot be part of Syria's future or transition.

I trust you agree that it is high time for Assad's crimes to be punished and justice served. Scaling up today's strike into a full-scale no-fly zone will strip Assad from his deadliest and only military advantage in his war against his own people. It would also enable the Free Syrian Army to advance in creating the necessary balance of power on the ground to make the political process viable. While the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces shares the international community's belief that the solution in Syria can only be political, we believe that unless Assad comes under genuine pressure and military challenge he will not engage in the process. Furthermore, the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces takes this opportunity to reiterate the importance of accountability and to demand that Assad and all war criminals be referred to the International Criminal Court or other justice mechanisms to put an end to the culture of impunity that has emboldened Assad for far too long.

We count on the sincerity of our good friends and allies to assist the Syrian people in their legitimate struggle for freedom, justice and dignity.

(*Signed*) Anas **Abdah**
President
National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces

United Nations A/71/870–S/2017/309

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
12 April 2017

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 31
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 7 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government I transmit herewith for your attention the record of the ceasefire violations by the Azerbaijani armed forces during the month of March 2017 (see annex I).*

I also transmit herewith for your attention the record of ceasefire violations, registered by the Ministry of Defence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic during the month of March 2017 (see annex II).*

I kindly request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* Circulated in the language of submission only.

17-06006 (E) 170417

Please recycle

Annex I to the letter dated 7 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan along the State border with the Republic of Armenia

1-31 March 2017

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
1 March	Tavush, Syunik regions	19	Small arms and light weapons: 517
	Aygedzor	10	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6
	Chinari	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 20
	Paravakar	1	
	Kirants	1	
	Aygehovit	1	
	Berdavan	1	
	Baghanis	1	
	Voskevan	1	
	Shaghat	1	
2 March	Tavush, Syunik regions	13	Small arms and light weapons: 122
	Aygedzor	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 46
	Chinari	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Voskevan	1	
	Dovegh	2	
	Chapni	2	
3 March	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	51	Small arms and light weapons: 1,067
	Aygedzor	10	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 74
	Chinari	13	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 20 (Chinari 8; Aygedzor 8; Berdavan 4)
	Paravakar	2	
	Berdavan	7	
	Baghanis	4	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	2	
	Aygepar	5	
	Movses	2	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
	Vazashen	5	
	Geghamasar	1	
4 March	Tavush, Syunik, Gegharkunik, Ararat regions	26	Small arms and light weapons: 450 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 9 (Chinari 6; Berdavan 3)
	Chinari	5	
	Paravakar	2	
	Berdavan	7	
	Movses	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Dovegh	1	
	Chapni	4	
	Jil	1	
	Vahan	1	
	Chambarak	1	
	Yeraskh	2	
5 March	Tavush, Ararat regions	17	Small arms and light weapons: 108 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 13 (Aygedzor 12; Chinari 1) Large-calibre machine guns: 35 (Koti 25; Voskevan 10)
	Aygedzor	4	
	Chinari	5	
	Paravakar	3	
	Voskevan	1	
	Berkaber	1	
	Koti	2	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
6 March	Tavush, Syunik, Gegharkunik regions	11	Small arms and light weapons: 100 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 12
	Chinari	7	
	Paravakar	1	
	Movses	1	
	Chapni	1	
	Vahan	1	
7 March	Tavush, Ararat regions	11	Small arms and light weapons: 65 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4
	Chinari	3	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
	Voskevan	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Chinari 3)
	Movses	1	
	Berkaber	1	
	Azatamut	1	
	Voskepar	1	
	Kirants	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
8 March	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	7	Small arms and light weapons: 121
	Chinari	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Kayan 7)
	Paravakar	1	
	Aygehovit	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Vahan	1	
9 March	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat regions	11	Small arms and light weapons: 45 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Chinari	9	
	Paravakar	2	
10 March	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	11	Small arms and light weapons: 180
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 11 (Vahan 3; Voskevan 8)
	N. Karmkiraghbyur	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Vazashen	3	
	Voskevan	1	
	Vahan	3	
11 March	Tavush region	7	Small arms and light weapons: 168
	Chinari	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Chinari 10)
	Voskevan	1	
	Movses	1	
	Vahan	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
12 March	Tavush region	6	Small arms and light weapons: 68
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 3
	Chinari	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Berdavan	1	
13 March	Tavush region	9	Small arms and light weapons: 362
	Chinari	5	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 62
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10
	Paravakar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 350
	Berdavan	1	
14 March	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	12	Small arms and light weapons: 230
	Chinari	7	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15
	Paravakar	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Koti 3)
	Koti	1	
	Berdavan	1	
	Kakhakan	1	
15 March	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat, Vayots Dzor regions	24	Small arms and light weapons: 138
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8
	Chinari	7	Grenade launchers: 3
	Aygedzor	1	
	Aygepar	1	
	Paravakar	3	
	Movses	1	
	Vazashen	2	
	Baghanis	2	
	Berdavan	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
	Chapni	1	
	Vahan	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
	Yeraskh	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
	Khndzorut	1	
16 March	Tavush, Ararat regions	14	Small arms and light weapons: 55
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Berdavan 1)
	Aygepar	1	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Paravakar	4	
	Vazshen	3	
	Berdavan	2	
17 March	Tavus, Gegharkunik regions	23	Small arms and light weapons: 589
	Chinari	7	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 42
	Aygedzor	4	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 15 (Aygedzor 15)
	Movses	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 108
	N. Karmiraghbyur	3	
	Paravakar	1	
	Aygepar	1	
	Vazashen	2	
	Kirants	1	
	Voskepar	1	
	Vahan	2	
18 March	Tavush, Ararat regions	9	Small arms and light weapons: 34
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1
	Aygedzor	1	
	Movses	1	
	Aygepar	1	
	Sevkar	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Yeraskh	2	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
19 March	Tavush, Ararat regions	9	Small arms and light weapons: 56
	Chinari	4	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 35 (Chinari 35)
	Movses	1	
	Aygepar	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Yeraskh	2	
20 March	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 63
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4
	Chambarak	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
21 March	Tavush, Ararat regions	26	Small arms and light weapons: 494
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15
	Aygedzor	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 40 (Chapni 40)
	Aygepar	3	Large-calibre machine guns: 13
	Movses	2	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Paravakar	5	
	Berkaber	3	
	Kayan	3	
	Koti	1	
	Berdavan	1	
	Chapni	2	
	Jil	1	
22 March	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	12	Small arms and light weapons: 233
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Aygedzor	5	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 11 (Aygedzor 11)
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Sarigyugh	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Berdavan	1	
	Jil	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
23 March	Tavush, Ararat regions	5	Small arms and light weapons: 345
	Aygepar	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10
	Kayan	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 13 (Nuzger 7; Ashagi Veysali 6)
	Voskevan	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
24 March	Tavush region	2	Small arms and light weapons: 459
	Paravakar	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7
	Barekamavan	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 13 (Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 13)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 570
25 March	Tavush region	8	
	Chinari	3	
	Movses	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Vazashen	2	
	Kayan	1	
26 March	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	6	Small arms and light weapons: 246
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4
	Aygehovit	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (Yusifjanli 6)
	Vazashen	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Jil	2	
27 March	Tavush region	6	Small arms and light weapons: 327
	Chinari	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (Mehdili 2; Kurapatkino 4)
	Paravakar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 5
28 March	Tavush, Ararat regions	13	Small arms and light weapons: 151
	Aygedzor	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6
	Chinari	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Aygedzor 3)
	Paravakar	4	
	Berdavan	2	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
	Yeraskh	1	
29 March	Tavush region	6	Small arms and light weapons: 19
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10
	Chinari	1	
	Paravakar	3	
	Aygepar	1	
30 March	Tavush, Syunik regions	12	Small arms and light weapons: 152
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 22
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 30 (Chapni 30)
	Movses	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 190
	Paravakar	2	
	Kayan	1	
	Vazshen	1	
	Baghanis	1	
	Chapni	3	
31 March	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat regions	9	Small arms and light weapons: 159
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10
	Chinari	1	
	Aygedzor	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Aygepar	1	
	Vazashen	3	
	Chambarak	1	
	Tigranashen	1	

Annex II to the letter dated 7 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with the Nagorno Karabakh Republic

1-31 March 2017

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
1 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	78	Small arms and light weapons: 1,025 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 44 Grenade launchers: 10 Small-calibre mortars: 10 (Karakhanbeyli 3; Seydakhmedli 1; Ashaghi Veysali 4; Namerli 2) Large-calibre mortars: 7 (Ashaghi Veysali 7) Artillery: 1 (Seysulan 1) multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS): 5 (Asaghi Veysali 5)
2 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	67	Small arms and light weapons: 963 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 103 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Talish 7) Large-calibre machine guns: 51 Grenade launchers: 24 Small-calibre mortars: 20 (Nuzger 2; Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli 4; Ashaghi Veysali 2; Karvend 6; Yarmja 2; Verin Chaylu 4) MLRS: 7 (Karvend 7)
3 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	119	Small arms and light weapons: 1,942 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 41 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 24 (Nuzger 2; Seysulan 15; Talish 4; Gyulistan 3) Large-calibre machine guns: 7 Grenade launchers: 7 Small-calibre mortars: 99 (Talish 32; Bash Karvend 38; Kengerli 19; Shikhlyar 2; Sarijanli 1; Shurabad 1; Talish 6)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
4 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	32	Small arms and light weapons: 333 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 24 (Nuzger 1; Gyulistan 23) Small-calibre mortars: 7 (Kurapatkino 2; Taghibeyli 3; Shikhlyar 2) Artillery: 2 (Bash Karvend 2)
5 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	34	Small arms and light weapons: 559 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 27
6 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	41	Small arms and light weapons: 1,005 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 13 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Verin Chaylu 10) Large-calibre machine guns: 2 Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Yarmja 1)
7 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	24	Small arms and light weapons: 1,170 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Levonarkh 3)
8 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons 401 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 71 (Horadiz 2; Mehdili 15; Kurapatkino 6; Bash Karvend 47; Jraberd 1)
9 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 433 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 22 (Bash Karvend 20; Taghibeyli 2)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
10 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 410 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 20 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 78 (Bash Karvend 78) Large-calibre machine guns: 60 Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Yarmja 1)
11 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	9	Small arms and light weapons: 95 Small-calibre sniper weapons 2 Grenade launchers: 3 Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Verin Chaylu 1)
12 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	38	Small arms and light weapons: 68 Large-calibre machine guns: 3
13 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	39	Small arms and light weapons: 500 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 39 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 15 (Mehdili 1; Yusifjanli 6; Jraberd 4; Levonarkh 1; Verin Chaylu 3) Large-calibre machine guns: 1 Grenade launchers: 1
14 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	40	Small arms and light weapons: 613 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Darchinar 1; Shikhlyar 2) Small-calibre mortars: 2 (Mehdili 1; Nuzger 1)
15 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	42	Small arms and light weapons: 1,837 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Horadiz 4) Large-calibre machine guns: 35
16 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	26	Small arms and light weapons: 546 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 19 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Mehdili 3; Nuzger 5; Kurapatkino 2) Large-calibre machine guns: 1

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
17 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	29	Small arms and light weapons: 549 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15
18 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	27	Small arms and light weapons: 201 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 17 (Mehdili 17) Large-calibre machine guns: 20
19 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	19	Small arms and light weapons: 347 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3
20 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	22	Small arms and light weapons: 124 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 26 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Mehdili 7)
21 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	33	Small arms and light weapons: 325 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4 Large-calibre machine guns: 17
22 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	29	Small arms and light weapons: 358 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 37 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Verin Chaylu 1)
23 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	30	Small arms and light weapons: 345 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 13 (Nuzger 7; Ashagi Veysali 6)
24 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	32	Small arms and light weapons: 459 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 13 (Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 13) Large-calibre machine guns: 57

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
25 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	29	Small arms and light weapons: 1,134 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 19 (Mehdili 4; Kurapatkino 5; Bash Karvend 4; Levonarkh 6) Large-calibre machine guns: 350
26 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	18	Small arms and light weapons: 246 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (Yusifjanli 6)
27 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	30	Small arms and light weapons: 327 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (Mehdili 2; Kurapatkino 4) Large-calibre machine guns: 5
28 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	23	Small arms and light weapons: 400 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 42 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Shikhlyar 3)
29 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	16	Small arms and light weapons: 561 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17 Large-calibre machine guns: 4
30 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	35	Small arms and light weapons: 450 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 24 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 22 (Mehdili 5; Yusifjanli 17)
31 March	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	47	Small arms and light weapons: 778 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 69 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 17 (M. Karachuk 6; Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 8; Yusifjanli 1; Gyulistan 2)

Three soldiers of the Nagorno Karabakh Defence Army were killed and four soldiers were wounded from the Azerbaijani side during the reporting period.

United Nations S/2017/310

Security Council

Distr.: General
11 April 2017
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 10 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instruction from my Government, I write further to our numerous letters regarding the refusal of Israel to implement authoritative international resolutions that require it to withdraw from all of the occupied Syrian Golan to the line of 4 June 1967 and its continued violation of international law and the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement. Furthermore, in response to the letter from the representative of Israel, the occupying Power, dated 13 March 2017 (S/2017/215), in which he alleged that Syria had violated the Agreement, I should to like to inform you of the following:

The command of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in Damascus informed the Syrian side that the occupying Israeli authorities had not informed UNDOF of those alleged "violations", nor had the Force documented such violations in accordance with the Agreement.

Based on the coordinates provided by the representative of the occupying Power, some 95 per cent of those alleged "violations" occurred in areas controlled by the armed terrorist groups that Israel protects and sponsors and to which it provides all forms of support. Those areas are in the southern part of the area of separation and in Qahtaniyah, Qunaytirah, Hamidiyah and Jubbata al-Khashab. That support is a continuation of the violations of the Agreement that have been committed by Israel, the occupying Power, and documented in numerous United Nations reports.

The letter of the representative of the occupying Power is part of the effort to cover up Israeli support for armed terrorist groups, including Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and the Nusrah Front, the repeated attacks by Israel against the sovereignty of Syria and Israel's targeting of civilians in towns and villages throughout the area of separation.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic calls upon the United Nations and, in particular, the Security Council to take prompt measures to bring an immediate end to Israeli violations. It also calls upon the Organization to force Israel to cease its support for armed terrorist groups, in accordance with Council resolutions concerning counter-terrorism, press Israel to implement the relevant Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 497 (1981), and compel Israel to withdraw from all of the occupied Syrian Golan to the line of 4 June 1967.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-05945 (E) 130417 130417

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United Nations S/2017/311

Security Council

Distr.: General
11 April 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 10 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon instruction from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a list clarifying the number of civilian casualties and injuries, in addition to loss of infrastructure and public and private properties, caused by mortar shells launched by terrorist armed groups against safe neighbourhoods in the city of Damascus and its suburbs from 2 to 4 April 2017 (see annex).

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-05928 (E) 130417

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Annex to the letter dated 10 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

List clarifying the number of civilian casualties and injuries, in addition to loss of infrastructure and public and private properties, caused by mortar shells launched by terrorist armed groups against safe neighbourhoods in the city of Damascus and its suburbs from 2 to 4 April 2017

Place of fall	*Number of mortar shells*	*Casualties and wounded*
2 April 2017		
Abbasiyin neighbourhood	3	3 wounded
Abu Rummanah street	1	2 casualties 5 wounded
Qabun neighbourhood	1	2 casualties 6 wounded
Tishrin neighbourhood	1	4 casualties 9 wounded
3 April 2017		
Adawi street	7	5 wounded
Aqraba area	2	
Bab Tuma	3	4 casualties 7 wounded
Baghdad street	2	3 wounded
Fayha' highway	3	2 casualties 4 wounded
Jaramana area	2	3 wounded
Maliki street	3	1 casualty 13 wounded
Mazzah area	2	4 casualties 11 wounded
Qabun neighbourhood	1	3 casualties 4 wounded
Sayyidah Zainab area	2	3 casualties 10 wounded
Sumariyah area	2	3 wounded
Tijarah area	1	
Tishrin park	2	6 wounded
Zablatani area	2	1 casualty 2 wounded
4 April 2017		
Abu Rummanah street	3	1 casualty 15 wounded
Amin street	3	4 casualties 19 wounded

Place of fall	*Number of mortar shells*	*Casualties and wounded*
Asad suburb	11	6 casualties 16 wounded
Bab Tuma	1	1 casualty 9 wounded
Bazuriyah neighbourhood	1	4 wounded
Fayha' highway	3	1 casualty 5 wounded
Imarah neighbourhood	2	2 casualties 11 wounded
Jaramana area	11	5 casualties 40 wounded
Maliki street	1	6 wounded
Marjah square	1	1 casualty 7 wounded
Mazzah area	2	1 casualty 6 wounded
Near the Russian Embassy	1	1 wounded
Qabun neighbourhood	2	2 casualties 5 wounded
Shaghur neighbourhood	1	3 casualties 11 wounded
T.jarah area	4	4 wounded
Tishrin park	1	3 wounded
Umayyad Square	4	3 casualties 18 wounded
Total	**56 casualties**	**274 wounded**

United Nations S/2017/312

Security Council

Distr.: General
11 April 2017

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 28 of Security Council resolution 2318 (2016), in which the Council requested me to continue to inform it of progress in implementing the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) and to bring to its immediate attention any serious violation of the 20 June 2011 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on temporary arrangements for the administration and security of the Abyei Area (S/2011/384, annex). The present report provides an update on the situation in Abyei and on the operations of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism since the issuance of my previous report (S/2016/864) on 12 October 2016, and covers the period until 14 April 2017.

2. During the reporting period, a strategic review of the mandate of UNISFA was undertaken pursuant to paragraph 29 of Security Council resolution 2318 (2016) and presented on 5 April 2017 (see S/2017/293).

II. Abyei

Security

3. The security situation in the Abyei Area is generally calm; however, in the absence of progress in the implementation of the 20 June 2011 Agreement and discussions on the final status of the territory, intercommunal tensions and the proliferation of arms present a continued risk. During meetings of the joint security committee with both the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya communities during the reporting period, UNISFA received reports of the presence of armed elements in the Abyei Area. The Mission responded by enhancing its presence in the affected areas through supplementary patrols. There have been no reports of any Sudan Armed Forces or Sudan People's Liberation Army presence in the Abyei Area.

4. During the reporting period, around 35,000 Misseriya nomads arrived in the Abyei Area as part of their annual southwards migration, which usually occurs from October to mid-May. The movement has proceeded without any major incident thanks to the Mission's proactive conflict prevention and mitigation strategy. UNISFA maintains corridors to permit the Misseriya and their cattle to move through the Abyei Area, allowing the two communities to share grazing and water

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resources and, in so doing, preventing intercommunal tensions. Robust monitoring, in particular of flashpoint areas, has been the foundation of this strategy, with patrols during the day and night and armed elements being prevented from entering the area.

5. No major security incidents have taken place thus far and, while some instances of cattle rustling have occurred, both the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities have largely returned the cattle taken and compensation has been arranged through local peace committees. In order to ensure security, UNISFA deployed additional troops at important locations along migration route corridors: Noong and Alal in the central sector and Dungoup in the southern sector. In addition, the Mission controlled Misseriya access to the south-western and south-eastern parts of the Abyei Area. The Mission also maintained frequent engagement with both communities during the migration season through joint security committees at the sector level, as well as community-level engagement.

6. For a second consecutive dry season, UNISFA relaxed the implementation of the disengagement line. This flexibility has been enabled by the continued adherence of the two communities to the agreement of 24 March 2016 at Noong, whereby the Ngok Dinka allowed the Misseriya and their cattle access to water and pasture in areas inhabited by the Ngok Dinka. The Mission's success in managing the disengagement line has encouraged the return of the Ngok Dinka, with new settlements observed during the reporting period in the areas north of the Kiir/Bahr-al-Arab River.

7. Criminality remained largely intra-ethnic; the majority of reported incidents were petty crime. There were also some cases of armed theft and carjacking. Over the past year, the central sector has developed into a hub for criminal activities, with a rise in the economic importance of the Amiet common market and in the north-south movement of traders along the all-weather road from Diffra in the northern sector to Amiet and further southwards to Abyei in the central sector. In response, UNISFA troops enhanced their presence along the critical Farouk-Diffra-Amiet-Abyei-Agok axis to deter criminal activity. On 19 October, armed assailants shot and killed a Ngok Dinka man and seriously wounded a woman. On 17 November, the Amiet market joint traditional court found that the available evidence was insufficient to convict two Misseriya accused of the attack. The two were handed over to the Misseriya traditional chief. UNISFA has increased its security presence at the Amiet common market while encouraging the two communities to cooperate with the Mission on addressing criminality.

8. On 21 December at night, in Noong, assailants fired two rocket-propelled grenades, injuring five people, including two women and a three-year-old child. On 9 January, UNISFA troops prevented violence by intercepting around 10 armed Misseriya near Nainai in the central sector. In the ensuing exchange of fire, one Misseriya was killed. The timing of these incidents suggested that the aim of these armed elements was to influence the deliberations at the meetings of intercommunity traditional leaders held on 30 December and 12 January.

9. Despite enhanced security at critical road crossings by UNISFA, a World Health Organization-Sudan vehicle was carjacked by armed assailants on 17 January north of Diffra. Another carjacking attempt on contractors for the International Organization for Migration travelling from Diffra towards Goli in the northern sector on 17 February resulted in the death of a contractor and the wounding of his driver. Following the attack, UNISFA further reinforced its procedures to ensure the safety of its staff and workers connected with the projects of UNISFA and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in the Abyei Area by requiring force protection for all movement north of Dokura/Rumajak in the central sector and between Abyei and

Agok in the southern sector. The completion of the perimeter wall decreased theft within the UNISFA and the United Nations common premises compound. Only three instances of petty theft occurred during the reporting period.

10. Given the unpredictable security situation and continuing tensions between the communities, UNISFA has still not been able to redeploy to Abyei Sudanese national staff who were evacuated to Khartoum and Kadugli in South Kordofan following the killing of the Ngok Dinka Paramount Chief in 2013. The security situation also had an impact on the work of the Joint Military Observer Committee, which has only been able to conduct separate patrols with the Sudanese monitors deployed north of Todach in the northern sector and the South Sudanese monitors in areas south of Abyei in the central sector.

11. During the reporting period, UNISFA conducted 19,314 day and night area patrols and 7,460 escorts. Given that the Abyei Police Service has not been established, the UNISFA police component continued its efforts to support the maintenance of law and order, with 400 security observation and community-based interactive patrols undertaken during the reporting period. In addition, UNISFA facilitated 276 joint security committee meetings with community leaders in the Abyei Area. Capacity-building of community protection committees in accordance with paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 2287 (2016) continued, with two training workshops organized by UNISFA police during the reporting period for 60 community protection committee members in Agok and Abyei. The establishment of community protection committees in northern Abyei continued to be delayed owing to long-standing reservations of the Government of the Sudan, which has maintained that such committees are not in line with the 20 June 2011 Agreement.

12. In line with the Mission's mandate to confiscate and destroy weapons, UNISFA military and police, working with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), destroyed 16 confiscated weapons and over 1,500 rounds of small arms ammunition at the UNISFA weapons and ammunition management facility. The process was observed by national monitors from the Sudan and South Sudan. During the reporting period, 294 km of priority routes were verified as safe from explosive hazards. Non-technical survey and mine risk education activities in various communities led to the identification and destruction of 129 items of explosive remnants of war and 281 rounds of small arms ammunition. All UNISFA company operating bases, comprising 379,800 m^2, were reassessed as safe from explosive hazards. Mine risk education messages were delivered to 246 UNISFA military observers and national monitors. Similar messages were also delivered to over 32,000 men, women, boys and girls living in the Abyei Area, including nomadic herdsmen and returnees.

Political developments

13. During the reporting period, the Sudan and South Sudan made little progress with respect to the implementation of the 20 June 2011 Agreement. The Abyei Joint Oversight Committee last met on 29 and 30 March 2015. In November 2016, the Acting Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major-General Hassen Ebrahim Mussa, engaged with the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan in Addis Ababa to convene an extraordinary meeting of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee. The African Union High-level Implementation Panel scheduled a meeting of the Committee in Addis Ababa on 13 and 14 January 2017, which was never held. Meanwhile, in Abyei town on 31 October 2016, in commemoration of the third anniversary of the unilateral referendum held in the Abyei Area, around 700 Ngok Dinka led by the Paramount

Chief demonstrated in front of UNISFA headquarters and handed over a petition letter calling for recognition of the referendum.

14. Speaking to the media in February, traditional leaders from both the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities in Abyei called for the release of the report of the African Union investigation into the killing of the Ngok Dinka Paramount Chief in May 2013. Following the killing, the African Union Peace and Security Council tasked a committee with investigating the incident; the result was presented to the African Union in October 2013. The report was inconclusive, however, as the parties failed to agree on the findings of the investigation.

15. The Government of the Sudan continued to maintain approximately 120 armed personnel at the Diffra oil complex, in violation of the 20 June 2011 Agreement and several Security Council resolutions. For its part, the Government of South Sudan continued to maintain a de facto "local administration" in the central and southern Abyei Area, replacing the head of this administration in January 2017.

Intercommunal dialogue

16. UNISFA continued to facilitate dialogue between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities in order to prevent and mitigate conflict during the ongoing migration season. As noted previously, however, the lack of progress in the implementation of the 20 June 2011 Agreement has resulted in continued tensions between the two communities, and so has the pending resolution of issues related to the assassination of the Ngok Dinka Paramount Chief in May 2013.

Amiet common market

17. The mainstay of the strategy of UNISFA to assist both communities in their efforts to achieve peace and a measure of economic security was to provide support for the Amiet common market. As per the agreement by both communities at Todach in the northern sector on 4 August 2016, the common market was to function at Amiet only temporarily, until 31 December 2016, with the understanding that the two sides would reconvene in December 2016 to decide on its future location. On 30 December, at a meeting facilitated by UNISFA in Todach, the two communities could not reach an agreement on the location of the common market. The Ngok Dinka favoured keeping the market in its present location in Amiet, whereas the Misseriya wanted to transfer the market to Abyei town. Both communities reconvened in Todach on 26 January, but the meeting did not commence, as the Ngok Dinka objected to the absence of the peace committee members within the Misseriya delegation, despite Misseriya claims that their traditional leaders were fully able to represent their community.

18. Subsequently, the Misseriya traditional chiefs presented a letter to UNISFA calling for the closure of the market at Amiet, adding that they would not be responsible for any security consequences. UNISFA has taken precautionary security measures and maintains a deterrent, preventive and responsive posture. Despite these disagreements, there have been no major security incidents or interruptions to the functioning of the Amiet common market. In February, joint peace committee meetings in Tejalei and Leu in the southern sector resulted in an agreement to continue trading activities at the common market until a decision is made regarding its permanent location.

19. A number of conflict-management workshops and training sessions were organized by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and its

implementing partner in November and December, including one that was held from 13 to 15 December in Todach, with joint participation from both communities. Across the Abyei Area, 23 quick-impact projects are being executed by UNISFA in close coordination with the two communities.

20. Additionally, the Mission facilitated joint peace committee meetings and supported the joint bodies that are managing the Amiet common market. UNISFA police mentored market guards on detention procedures, as well as on the handling of criminal incidents and suspects. At the request of the joint peace committees and the joint market committee, on 14 December a temporary detention facility was handed over to the joint traditional court holding sessions at the Amiet common market. UNISFA corrections experts conducted several visits to the Abyei, Agok and Amiet detention centres to assess the state of infrastructure and the condition of detainees.

21. Regarding the legal mechanisms to address criminal offences within the Abyei Area, the Mission continued to engage authorities in the Sudan and South Sudan on arrangements for the handover of individuals detained by the Mission in the performance of its mandate to protect civilians and ensure security in the Abyei Area. Proposals for the signing of memorandums of understanding on the matter were transmitted to Khartoum and Juba in October 2016. So far, there has been no response from either Government.

22. Besides security, UNISFA provided logistical and infrastructural support for the common market, including solar lights and the daily provision of water until an additional hand pump, constructed through humanitarian assistance, became operational on 4 December.

Humanitarian situation

23. The adverse economic situation, particularly in South Sudan, population movements, intercommunal tensions and limited or absent basic public services continued to result in significant humanitarian needs in the Abyei Area. United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and non-governmental organizations continued to provide humanitarian and recovery assistance to 160,000 vulnerable people in the Abyei Area. These included 59,000 people from the Ngok Dinka community, 13,000 Ngok Dinka returnees, 20,000 Ngok Dinka people displaced within the Abyei Area, 8,000 people displaced from neighbouring Unity and Warrap States in South Sudan, 25,000 people of the Misseriya community and 35,000 seasonal Misseriya nomads who entered the area in late 2016 and are expected to return in mid-2017. Additionally, an estimated 11,000 people displaced by conflict in South Sudan transited Abyei in order to reach their final destinations in the Sudan, with some receiving limited basic assistance.

24. In 2016, the humanitarian community shifted the focus from food distribution to more recovery-oriented interventions through food-for-assets projects. The community response to this shift was largely positive, with 69,310 people having benefited from the monthly food distribution. These initiatives have helped the community gradually transition from food aid dependency to conditional food assistance. Meanwhile, 6,842 displaced people from neighbouring Unity State in South Sudan continued to benefit from the general food distribution.

25. Efforts to support community livelihoods included the training of 50 community animal health workers, as well as the vaccination and treatment of about 200,000 livestock belonging to both the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities. Distribution of vegetable seeds and hand tools, coupled with specific training sessions, were targeted at 250 Ngok Dinka households engaged in the production of

cash crops. Distribution of fishing kits and training on post-harvest fish management were targeted at 120 Ngok Dinka households engaged in fish processing and marketing activities. Ngok Dinka and Misseriya community leaders participated in eight workshops to improve equitable management of and access to natural resources. Two structures for a veterinary clinic and a traditional court were completed and handed over to the traditional authorities as a part of recovery efforts. The operationalization of these projects, particularly the veterinary clinic, remains a challenge, as the community lacks the capacity to equip and run the facilities.

26. The provision of integrated primary health-care and nutrition services, including routine immunization and essential drugs, was temporarily interrupted because of funding challenges faced by the humanitarian community in many of the 13 health facilities and mobile clinics operating in the Abyei Area. Nutrition screening and programming support for patients with moderate or acute malnutrition continued under a targeted supplementary feeding programme in central and southern Abyei.

27. In the northern parts of the Abyei Area, ensuring a safe water supply for both residential communities and seasonal nomads remained a challenge. Nine new water boreholes were drilled, of which two were at the Amiet common market. Sixteen hand pumps were repaired; five existing hand pumps were upgraded to miniature solar-powered water yards; and five water yards were repaired, benefiting 35,000 people. Other major activities included the training of water user committees in water management and the maintenance of solar-powered water yards. Nevertheless, vandalism and theft of solar systems were widespread because of the limited law enforcement system.

28. Operational challenges included a lack of adequate funds for non-governmental organizations, particularly for primary health-care activities; high implementation costs owing to security and logistical constraints; carjacking in northern parts of Abyei; and delays in the issuance of travel permits and restrictions on the movement of personnel and supplies by the Government of the Sudan. The capacity to respond to needs in the northern parts of Abyei continued to be constrained, as no international non-governmental organizations operate in the area. The continuing conflict in South Sudan also affected humanitarian operations in the Abyei Area, including through high prices for supplies procured in South Sudan.

III. Status of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism

Political developments

29. Although the Sudan and South Sudan did not make any further progress on the resolution of the final status of the Abyei Area, relations between the two countries appeared to be on a positive trajectory. Presidents Omar Hassan A. Al-Bashir and Salva Kiir met on the margins of the Africa-Arab Summit held in Malabo on 23 November 2016 and reiterated their commitment with respect to the implementation of the 27 September 2012 agreements, including the border security arrangements. Additionally, both countries claimed to have prohibited the presence of the other's armed opposition groups in their territory. In November, the Sudan declared that it had denied the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition leader, Riek Machar, entry into the Sudan, while in January South Sudan claimed to have expelled the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North from its territory. Notwithstanding these gestures, on 13 February, in a public address to

female parliamentarians, President Al-Bashir maintained that Abyei remained a part of the Sudan. Meanwhile, both the Sudan Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army maintain a presence just outside the boundaries of the Abyei Area, highlighting the continuing risk of armed conflict between the two countries.

30. UNISFA continued its intensive engagement with both Governments on the need for the implementation of the Agreement of 20 June 2011 and the resumption of dialogue in order to jointly address the most pressing security and humanitarian issues in the area and to provide the necessary political support for peace and reconciliation efforts between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities. In their discussions with the UNISFA Acting Head of Mission and Force Commander during the reporting period, Sudanese officials maintained that the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee remained the sole framework for discussions with the Government of South Sudan, and expressed disappointment with the cancellation of a planned visit of representatives of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee-Sudan to Abyei town in October 2016 owing to security considerations following Ngok Dinka opposition. Sudanese officials reiterated the need for free and unhindered movement throughout Abyei and expressed the view that the Amiet common market should be relocated to Abyei town. South Sudanese officials, in turn, reiterated their position that the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee was irrelevant in the absence of a joint administration in Abyei, called for the withdrawal of the Diffra oil police and highlighted the need to ensure the "weapons-free" status of the area.

Operations

31. While there were no further meetings of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism or the joint security committee, the Sudan and South Sudan, in separate letters to UNISFA on 8 November and 15 November 2016, respectively, informed the Mission that their armed personnel had vacated the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone. The request of UNISFA for ground patrols by the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism to conduct a joint verification of the withdrawal was approved by the Sudan and South Sudan in November 2016 and February 2017, respectively. These patrols will be conducted in April 2017, with one ground patrol from each of the two sectors deployed at Kadugli and Gok Machar.

32. Following the previous regular meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, held in Addis Ababa on 5 June 2016, the Sudan and South Sudan made progress towards advancing the operational capability of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. In this regard, both countries agreed to activate the remaining two sector headquarters at Buram and Malakal. A reconnaissance mission to Buram was conducted on 21 January. Further progress will be determined by the outcome of the recent UNISFA strategic review.

33. The Mechanism continued routine aerial monitoring patrols over the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone despite significant operational challenges. Of 40 planned aerial monitoring patrols during the reporting period, 18 were successfully conducted, while 22 were cancelled. A total of 18 of these cancellations, including the suspension of the programme for the entire month of February, were the result of delays in receiving authorization from the South Sudanese authorities. The rest of the cancellations during the reporting period were the result of the unavailability of aircraft for technical reasons and unfavourable weather conditions. The earlier restrictions on aerial monitoring imposed by the local South Sudanese military formation in Gok Machar and Aweil were removed after a coordination visit by the chief of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, who was accompanied by the South Sudanese senior national monitor, to Gok Machar from 28 November to 1 December 2016.

34. Patrol support teams from UNMAS remained ready to deploy in support of the Mechanism's ground patrols at both sector headquarters in Kadugli, the Sudan, and Gok Machar, South Sudan. In addition, UNMAS delivered integrated ground patrol training for 63 national monitors, military observers and elements of the Ethiopian force protection unit to support preparedness and coordinated risk mitigation.

IV. Mission support

35. During the reporting period, the UNISFA military component stood at 4,499 (206 military observers/staff officers and 4,293 troops) against an authorized strength of 5,326. The UNISFA police component stood at 20 police officers (7 female and 13 male) against an authorized strength of 50. The total number of civilian staff stood at 126 international and 78 national staff onboard. The Government of the Sudan has issued 190 visas for UNISFA personnel, while visas for 14 staff members, 19 military personnel, 1 official visitor/consultant, 46 UNMAS personnel and 2 contractors remain pending. Three visas for the community liaison office, pending since May 2016, particularly impede the activities of UNISFA, since most activities are increasingly community-based, necessitating the presence of staff with civil affairs expertise. During the reporting period, the Mission completed the rotation of 1,272 troops and transportation of 59,214 kg cargo through Kadugli airport, conducting 91 rotary-wing round-trip airlifts (76 troop and 15 cargo).

36. During the ongoing dry season, UNISFA commenced the transformation of the Noong temporary operating base into a permanent operating base, using the Mission's engineering resources. It is expected to be fully established before the onset of the rainy season, which begins around June. With the Sudan having removed the restrictions on construction material coming into the Abyei Area, as indicated in my previous report, the Mission continues to upgrade the infrastructure and environmental installations at all camps. The construction of a perimeter wall and lighting around Mission headquarters in Abyei has been completed; this includes the area for accommodating the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism headquarters after its eventual move from Kadugli to Abyei. Site preparation work at the expansion site and improvement of the challenging living conditions at Mission headquarters in Abyei are ongoing. Four contracts for the replacement of depreciated old prefabricated accommodation units have been awarded in order to improve living conditions in the Mission camps across the Abyei Area. With regard to environmental and hygiene aspects, the replacement and installation of additional wastewater treatment plants is ongoing. Construction of new septic tanks for pre-treatment of septic waste has been completed. Establishment of a landfill for all Mission camps in the Abyei Area for the disposal of solid waste is ongoing.

V. Financial aspects

37. The General Assembly, by its resolution 70/269 of 17 June 2016, appropriated the amount of $268.6 million for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017. As at 22 March 2017, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNISFA amounted to $28.0 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $1,508.0 million. Reimbursement of troop costs has been made for the period up to 31 January 2017, while reimbursement of the costs of contingent-owned equipment has been made for the period up to 31 December 2016, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

VI. Observations and recommendations

38. Abyei continues to be of high strategic and economic importance to the Sudan and South Sudan, and any local conflict between the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities in the Abyei Area, or any direct confrontation on the border, could lead to increased tensions, with dire consequences for the wider region. The continued presence of UNISFA deters armed confrontation between the two countries. The Mission has also, through the proactive implementation of its conflict prevention and mitigation strategy and community engagement, contributed to ensuring a relatively stable security situation in the Abyei Area, where movements as part of the ongoing migration season have thus far been conducted without any major security incidents.

39. In order to consolidate gains achieved by UNISFA at the local level, it is necessary for the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan to actively engage in discussions on addressing the most pressing security and humanitarian concerns faced by the people of Abyei. In the absence of such regular engagement, UNISFA and humanitarian actors continue to operate in a governance vacuum. I therefore urge the parties to convene regular meetings of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee, which has not met since March 2015, to advance the implementation of the Agreement of 20 June 2011. This is long overdue and a necessary initial step in taking forward the intention of the two Governments regarding joint administration and policing in Abyei while an agreement on its final status is pending.

40. The continued presence of armed personnel at the Diffra oil complex in the northern Abyei Area and the operation of a de facto "local administration" in the southern Abyei Area continue to violate and to undermine the 20 June 2011 Agreement. I call upon the Government of the Sudan to withdraw its armed personnel from Diffra and on the Government of South Sudan to accept and participate in the joint administration arrangements and institutions established by the 20 June 2011 Agreement. I welcome the written declarations of both Governments regarding the withdrawal of their respective forces from the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone and the approval of verification ground patrols, which UNISFA plans to undertake by the end of April 2017. Aerial monitoring continues along the entire length of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone; the aerial surveillance capacity of the Mechanism could be enhanced within existing resources by deploying fixed-wing aircraft with advanced imaging and visibility capabilities, as recommended by the recent strategic review.

41. The Amiet common market remains the most visible symbol of the commitment of both the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities to peace and reconciliation at the local level; disagreement over its permanent location and its politicization at higher levels is regrettable. I strongly urge the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan to support the efforts of UNISFA to promote harmony and peaceful coexistence between the Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka communities, and to refrain from any actions that could create antagonism or confrontation. As a further step towards achieving reconciliation between the two communities, I reiterate the need to achieve closure on the 2013 killing of the Ngok Dinka Paramount Chief.

42. I am encouraged by the significant progress made by the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities on issues affecting their people and on reconciliation. Yet, much remains to be done to ensure the smooth implementation of the provisions of the Agreements of 20 June 2011 and 27 September 2012 on security arrangements. I therefore recommend the extension of the mandate of UNISFA for another six

months to help both Governments to make progress towards the goals that they have set for themselves in those Agreements.

43. In conclusion, I would like to commend the former Acting Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Hassen Ebrahim Mussa, for his tenure at the helm of UNISFA. I encourage his successor, Major General Tesfay Gidey Hailemichael, to innovatively take the Mission forward. I thank all United Nations staff, including staff of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, for their commitment to the cause of peace in the Abyei Area. The work of my Special Envoy, Nicholas Haysom, in energizing the political process is much appreciated. Finally, my thanks are also due to the former President of South Africa and Chair of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, Thabo Mbeki; the African Union Commission; the Peace and Security Council of the African Union; and the Government of Ethiopia, for their unstinting support for UNISFA and for standing tall in support of peace in the Abyei Area.


UNISFA
April 2017
Sector CENTER
Sector NORTH
Sector SOUTH
Abyei
SUDAN
SOUTH SUDAN
Battalion sector line
Undetermined international boundary
State boundary
Area of Operation
Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.
The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Map No. 4467 Rev. 34 UNITED NATIONS
April 2017 (Colour)

Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

United Nations S/2017/313

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 April 2017

Original: English

United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Haiti, in particular its resolutions 2313 (2016), 2243 (2015), 2180 (2014), 2119 (2013), 2070 (2012), 2012 (2011), 1944 (2010), 1927 (2010), 1908 (2010), 1892 (2009), 1840 (2008), 1780 (2007), 1743 (2007), 1702 (2006), 1658 (2006), 1608 (2005), 1576 (2004), and 1542 (2004),

Recognizing the major milestone towards stabilization achieved with the peaceful completion of the electoral process and return to constitutional order on 7 February 2017, and commending Haitian authorities, in particular the Haitian Provisional Electoral Council and the Haitian National Police (HNP), for their efforts towards ensuring elections were conducted in a credible and inclusive manner and held in a largely peaceful environment,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Haiti,

Commending the Special Representative of the Secretary-General's efforts and the role of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to support the political process in Haiti, the professionalization of the police and in the maintenance of a secure and stable environment,

Expressing its deep appreciation and gratitude to the personnel of MINUSTAH and to all Member States which have contributed to MINUSTAH and paying tribute to those injured or killed in the line of duty; *commending* the successful work achieved by MINUSTAH, including the wide range of reconstruction efforts conducted after the 2010 earthquake,

Welcoming the ongoing strengthening, professionalization and reform of the HNP, while noting the need for continued international support for the HNP so that it can fulfil its constitutional mandate, including by expanding its geographical reach and building its technical capacity, as well as its community-based programmes, as appropriate; *affirming* the importance of the 2017-2021 Strategic Development Plan of the HNP, developed on the basis of a joint HNP-United Nations Police (UNPOL) capacity and needs assessment,

Emphasizing the importance of the continued support of the United Nations and the international community for the long-term security and development of Haiti, particularly in building the capacity of the Government of Haiti, consolidating and building on the achievements of the past 13 years, while *encouraging* the Haitian authorities to address the longstanding risks of instability,

Please recycle

Recalling its resolutions 1645 (2005) and 2282 (2016) and *reaffirming* the primary responsibility of the national Government in implementing its peacebuilding and sustaining peace strategies to address the interconnected nature of challenges in Haiti, *highlighting* the contribution of sustainable development to peacebuilding and sustaining peace, and in this regard, *emphasizing* the importance of national ownership, inclusivity, and the role that civil society can play to advance national peacebuilding processes and objectives in order to ensure that the needs of all segments of society are taken into account,

Acknowledging that while important progress has been made, Haiti continues to face significant humanitarian challenges, especially in the aftermath of Hurricane Matthew, and *affirming* that progress in the reconstruction of Haiti, as well as in Haiti's social and economic development, including women and youth, through effective, coordinated, commendable international development assistance and increased Haitian institutional capacity to benefit from this assistance, is crucial to achieving lasting and sustainable stability, and *reiterating* the need for security to be accompanied by sustainable development in its social, economic and environmental dimensions, including efforts in risk reduction and preparedness that address the country's extreme vulnerability to natural disasters, efforts in which the Government of Haiti plays a leading role, with the assistance of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT),

Welcoming the General Assembly's resolution A/RES/71/161 on the United Nations 'New Approach to Cholera in Haiti'; *noting* that the implementation of this new approach will fall under the responsibility of the UNCT under the coordination of a DSRSG/HC/RC,

Recognizing that strengthening national human rights institutions as well as respect for human rights, including of women and children, due process and combating criminality, sexual and gender-based violence, and putting an end to impunity and ensuring accountability are essential to ensuring the rule of law and security in Haiti, including access to justice,

Considering that with the completion of the MINUSTAH consolidation plan and the implementation of the transition plan, a broader framework of mutual accountability among the Government of Haiti, the United Nations and the international community could be developed as part of a country strategy to enhance the effectiveness of the support of the follow-on United Nations presence in the country,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General of 16 March 2017 (S/2017/223), which includes observations and recommendations from the Strategic Assessment Mission requested by the Council in resolution 2313 (2016), and his recommendation that a new United Nations peacekeeping mission be established in Haiti following the termination of MINUSTAH by 15 October 2017, in order to continue to assist the Government of Haiti, to consolidate gains by reinforcing government institutions and strengthening the national capacity for rule of law, police development, and human rights,

Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, as described in section 1 of operative paragraph 7 of resolution 1542 (2004), and with regards to operative paragraphs 5 to 14 that relate to the new mission,

1. *Decides* to extend MINUSTAH's mandate, as contained in its resolutions 2313 (2016), 2243 (2015), 2180 (2014), 2119 (2013), 2070 (2012), 2012 (2011), 1944 (2010), 1927 (2010), 1908 (2010), 1892 (2009), 1840 (2008), 1780 (2007),

1743 (2007), 1702 (2006), 1658 (2006), 1608 (2005), 1576 (2004), and 1542 (2004), for a final period of six months, and that the Mission shall close by 15 October 2017;

2. *Decides* that the military component of MINUSTAH shall gradually drawdown during the final six-month period, fully withdrawing from Haiti by 15 October 2017;

3. *Reaffirms* that, in the framework of the improvement of the rule of law in Haiti, strengthening the justice sector and the capacity of the HNP, including in its efforts to strengthen the Directorate of Prisons Administration (DAP) management, is paramount for the Government of Haiti to take timely and full responsibility for Haiti's security needs;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to begin immediately to reduce MINUSTAH tasks in a phased manner ensuring that critical functions are defined and appropriate support capacity maintained, and *further requests* MINUSTAH to prioritize efforts and to ensure a successful and responsible transition to United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), as established in paragraph 5, and further strengthening the institutional and operational capacities of the HNP;

5. *Decides* to establish a follow-on peacekeeping mission in Haiti, MINUJUSTH, which shall be composed of up to seven Formed Police Units (FPUs) (or 980 FPU personnel) and 295 Individual Police Officers (IPOs), for an initial period of six months from 16 October 2017 until 15 April 2018, and emphasizes the importance of reaching the above-mentioned levels;

6. *Further decides* MINUJUSTH shall be mandated to assist the Government of Haiti to strengthen rule of law institutions in Haiti; further support and develop the HNP; and engage in human rights monitoring, reporting, and analysis;

7. *Further decides* that MINUJUSTH will be headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who will also play a good offices and advocacy role at the political level to ensure full implementation of the mandate;

8. *Underscores* that MINUJUSTH shall retain seven FPUs, reduced from MINUSTAH's current 11, deployed to five regional departments to safeguard the security gains of the past years through the provision of operational support to the HNP and that the number of FPUs shall be adjusted downward and harmonized with the gradual build-up of the HNP within a projected two-year timeframe;

9. *Stresses* that the 295 IPOs reduced from MINUSTAH's authorized 1,001 would play a key role in the implementation of the priorities in the HNP Strategic Development Plan 2017-2021;

10. *Further underscores* that the 38 government-provided corrections personnel reduced from the current level of 50 would play a key role in more fully engaging the HNP in efforts to strengthen the DAP management;

11. *Decides* that the rule of law efforts of MINUJUSTH, including community violence reduction efforts and quick impact projects, as appropriate, will be part of a strategy towards a continued, progressive transition to development actors;

12. *Authorizes* MINUJUSTH to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to support and develop the HNP and in paragraph 13;

13. *Further authorizes* the Mission to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, as needed;

14. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure medical enablers, and to also ensure air assets necessary to deploy security forces rapidly throughout Haiti and in support of the HNP;

15. *Reaffirms* the importance for MINUJUSTH to take fully into account gender mainstreaming as a crosscutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the Government of Haiti in ensuring the participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels;

16. *Recognizes* the ownership and primary responsibility of the Government and the people of Haiti over all aspects of the country's development; and *encourages* MINUJUSTH to continue its efforts to provide logistical and technical expertise, within available means and consistent with its mandate;

17. *Recalls* its resolution 2272 (2016), and all other relevant United Nations resolutions, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to ensure full compliance of all MINUSTAH and MINUJUSTH personnel with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse, and to continue to keep the Council informed, and *urges* troop and police-contributing countries to redouble efforts in preventing cases of misconduct and to ensure that acts involving their personnel are properly investigated and punished;

18. *Commends* the commitment of the troop- and police-contributing countries in implementing United Nations mandates in challenging environments, and in this connection, highlights the importance of addressing the issues of undeclared national caveats, lack of effective command and control, refusal to obey orders, failure to respond to attacks on civilians, and inadequate equipment, that may adversely affect effective mandate implementation;

19. *Further affirms* the importance of a successful and responsible transition between MINUSTAH and MINUJUSTH and *underscores* the importance of coordination between MINUJUSTH and UNCT, and *further requests* the Secretary-General to establish a MINUJUSTH advance planning team at the earliest possible date;

20. *Requests* the Secretary-General to complete the joint MINUSTAH and UNCT Transition Plan within the six-month period referred to in paragraph 1, in order for MINUJUSTH to be operational immediately following MINUSTAH's closure, detailing the transfer of tasks that will occur and addressing residual stabilization needs in the country;

21. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution, including any instances of mandate implementation failures, within 90 days and 180 days from its adoption, as well as in an assessment report 30 days before the expiration of MINUJUSTH's initial mandate;

22. *Requests* that the initial 90 day report include details on the joint MINUSTAH and UNCT Transition Plan referred to in paragraph 20, and *further requests* that the assessment report referenced in paragraph 21 set out a well-developed and clearly benchmarked projected two-year exit strategy to a non-peacekeeping United Nations presence in Haiti to continue supporting the efforts of the Government of Haiti in sustaining peace and peacebuilding;

23. *Expresses its intent* to continue to review conditions in Haiti, and to consider adapting MINUJUSTH's mandate and police force levels, as needed, to preserve the progress Haiti has made towards durable security and stability;

24. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.